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OIL AND GAS LAW, WATER LAW, EQUITY
PAUL C. LENNARTZ of the Sterling Bar
OIL AND GAS

Our advance sheets contained only one case concerning oil and
gas, which stems from a factual situation arising in Sterling.
Brown v. Kirk * covers a situation which arises more frequently
in oil areas than one generally imagines. The first grantor reserved
one-fourth of the minerals in his deed to grantee. When that
grantee (plaintiff here) conveys, he reserves one-half of the minerals, making no mention of his grantor's one-fourth reservation,
but intends to reserve an additional and full one-half in himself.
The contract of sale was no more specific than the deed. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court, and held that when the deed
is unambiguous, the intention of the parties is determined therefrom and extrinsic evidence may not be introduced to explain same;
that the words "except" and "reserve" were synonymous as used in
the conveyance; and that the grantee had reserved for himself,
not one-half, but one-fourth.
The important statutes passed by the legislature in 1953, that
is those statutes which are of interest to the general practitioner,
were:
1. Severance tax (indexed under "Income Tax" in the
1953 Session Laws).
2. Authorities to counties to excute 5-year term oil and
gas leases or for 10 years if lease carries non-drilling clause
(indexed under "Counties" in 1953 Session Laws).
3. Authority to school boards to execute 10-year oil and
gas leases (indexed under "Schools" in 1953 Session Laws).
WATER

Colorado Springs v. Public Utilities Commission I merely restates the holding in Englewood v. Denver2 that a home rule city
serving water outside its corporate limits is not a public utility
under the jurisdiction of the P.U.C.
Downing v. Copeland3 was an action to enjoin defendants'
interference with plaintiffs' use of water. Plaintiffs, owning land
and an appurtenant water right, diverted water from a stream.
A channel was built 424 feet in the creek-bed upstream on defendants' lands. Defendants had a ditch with a junior right with a
head-gate one mile upstream from plaintiffs. Defendants took
water when plaintiffs wanted and needed it. The channel had been
built several years prior to this action by plaintiffs. There was
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evidence that defendants at the time consented to the change.
Judgment for defendants reversed and remanded. The Supreme
Court held that original point of diversion had not been changed
as the new ditch was dug from the old point along the bed of the
stream and thus no application for a change was needed. Plaintiffs'
right to use and divert included the right to make and change the
necessary dams, channels or other diversion works within the
stream bed which might be necessary to enable them to use their
original headgate, where no additional burden on defendants results therefrom.
Williams v. Great Western Sugar Co.4 was an action for

breach of warranty and misrepresentation in a deed executed by
the sugar company to one of plaintiff's predecessors in title. In a
prior action, from which no appeal had been taken, the lower court
decreed that ditch company stock may limit the use of water to
a specific tract of land. In this case, the Supreme Court held that
the entire question had been previously adjudicated, that all subsequent grantees of defendant had notice of the prior litigation
and resulting decree, and upheld summary judgment in favor of
defendant issued in lower court.
Quirico v. Hickory JaIcson Ditch Company 5 was an action
by the ditch company to enjoin defendants' use of water. Defendants had diverted water from their headgate since about 1914.
The plaintiff Ditch Company set up a decree of 1919 to the Alamosa Ditch and also asserted a right to use water being used by
defendants through a contract and filing of application for beneficial use. The original decree was re-opened in 1924 without notice
to the defendants and plaintiff awarded water, and again in 1934
without notice to defendants, plaintiff had decree re-opened and
water now in question adjudicated to it. Plaintiff stands on the
2 and 4-year statute of limitation (Chapter 90. Sec. 183, C.S.A.).
In reversing the lower court, the Supreme Court held that the
statute does not operate against one without notice where he knew
nothing of the decrees nor had been molested in his use until after
the 4-year limit; therefore, the statute does not start to run until
he receives notice.
Peterson v. Water Conservation District 6 was presumably
an action to adjudicate title to water. Defendants, junior appropriators, contend that plaintiff had no water right by reason of
abandonment. "A", a corporation, owned land and certain decreed water rights. In 1915 a deed of trust covering the land and
water rights was given to "B". "C", Ranch Manager, and majority
stockholder of "A", testified that he abandoned said water rights
in 1920. "B" foreclosed its Deed of Trust in 1923, and deed subsequently issued to "B". "B" sold to "D", the plaintiff, in 1929,
4 ........ Colo .......... 251 P. 2d 912 (1952). 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 6.
........ Colo .......... 251 P. 2d 937 (1952). 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 8.
........ Colo ---....... 254 P. 2d 422 (1953). 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 11.
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and by tax sale in 1929 said land and water rights vested in "E",
who then conveyed back his interest to "D", the plaintiff, in 1930.
Since 1930 there was no evidence of abandonment but only evidence of use of less water than originally decreed. Trial court held
for defendants. Reversed and remanded by Supreme Court which
held that even if you assume "C" had the right to abandon the
rights of "A", the corporation, the equity owner, he could not
abandon the rights of "B" in the position of mortgagee under their
deed of trust, and that "B", mortgagee, must also abandon the
rights under the mortgage. The equity owner has not more right
to abandon mortgagee's rights than he does to sell such rights out
from under the security of the mortgage.
Granby Ditch Co. v. Hallenbeck 7 was an action to adjudicate
title to water. Plaintiff ditch company held decreed 1894 rights for
10 cubic feet per second from Dirty George Creek. Plaintiff asks
to establish claim for water diverted and intercepted below its decreed headgate on the basis of adverse user for over 56 years. Defendants, subsequent appropriators, appeared at statutory appropriation proceedings where their priorities were established. Plaintiff did not appear at these proceedings to assert and establish
their claim. Judgment of lower court was affirmed. The court held
that abandoned water did not go to adverse user, but to subsequent appropriators in the order of their decreed priority; that
one who openly and adversely diverts water for 56 years without
a decree loses all rights if he fails to appear at statutory adjudication proceedings to assert his rights against subsequent claimants.
In Holbrook IrrigationDistrict v. Adcock 8 the plaintiff irrigation district brought an action for declaratory judgment to determine defendants' rights to irrigation water. The plaintiff acquired the rights and facilities of a canal company subject to all
contracts previously made by the canal company. Plaintiff then
enlarged the system with additional dams, reservoirs and canals.
Under water deed from original canal company to defendant a
maximum cost of water was set at $37.50 for each 80 acres of land
irrigated. Defendant elected to remain outside of the Irrigation
District boundaries after same was organized, paid only the $37.50
for water while those in the district paid considerably more. The
lower court held that defendant was entitled to water from all
of the reservoirs of the district, but that the county commissioners
could not set the amount of payments assessable against the defendants for water. Reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court
held that defendants were entitled to water from only one reservoir existing at the time the original grant was made, that the
county commissioners could not assess the payments, and that the
defendants could only be charged $37.50 in accordance with the
original deed. The effect of this holding establishes the rule that
........
Colo ..........
255 P. 2d 965 (1953). 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 14, p. 225.
0.....
Colo.........
,255 P. 2d 384 (1953). 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 15, p. 235.
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when an irrigation district acquires the water rights and facilities
of a canal company subject to all contracts previously made by
the canal company, it must honor such contracts, even though they
require delivery of water at a rate lower than the irrigation district must charge its own members.
Mendenhall v. Lake Meredith Reservoir Co 9 was an action
to enjoin defendants' diverting water and for damages therefor,
compliance therewith involving replacement of a dam in the stream.
Judgment for defendants. The Supereme Court upheld the lower
court and restated the well established principle that an appropriator of water from a natural stream has a vested right to the
continued maintenance of conditions on the stream as they existed
at the time he made his appropriation, but the court held that plaintiff failed to offer sufficient proof to establish his contention.
EQuITY
In Lesser v. Lesser 1 an action was brought to rescind a deed
executed by 80-year-old plaintiff, violently ill, in favor of his son.
The son died 14 months later, leaving defendant as sole and only
heir at law. Plaintiff's testimony was discredited due to court interpreter's inabaliity to interpret his unusual German dialect. Evidence disclosed plaintiff was seriously ill at time of execution, and
that the son was the only child of plaintiff who cared and advanced
money for his father. The property was valued at $1,500, and the
son spent $774.67 for his father.
Trial court judgment reversed in favor of defendant on basis
that close relationship between father and son raised a presumption against the validity of the deed; however, defendant successfully assumed the burden of going forward and rebutting plaintiff's evidence. The burden of proof did not shift from the plaintiff.
Plaintiff failed to offer proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and therefore failed to sustain his burden of proof. To defeat such a conveyance something more than exertion of the natural influence
exerted on a father by a son must be shown, such as imposition,
fraud, importunity or duress.
In Sanger v. Larson Construction Company 2 the plaintiff
brought an action for damages of $15,000 for trespass to his land.
State of Colorado entered an ex parte order of condemnation of
certain lands of plaintiff for a road and the "Temporary Possession" order was served by plaintiff. Plaintiff knew of the intended
condemnation, but had no notice of the hearing. The statute required none. After completion of the road by defendant with the
consent of the plaintiff, who even leased defendant a camp site,
plaintiff discovered a new Colorado case holding that notice had
to be given in such condemnation proceedings.
- Colo .......... 257 P. 2d 414 (1953). 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 20, p. 319.
........ Colo .......... 250 P. 2d 130 (1952). 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 3, p. 44.
........ Colo .......... 251 P. 2d 930 (1952). 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 8.
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The Court held that estoppel en pais or equitable estoppel operated to bar this plaintiff's claim even though plaintiff allowed defendant to enter his land under the belief that the temporary order
was valid.
In Ginsburg v. Zager - the plaintiff brought an action for
damages sustained in connection with her purchase of a new residence property in Denver, alleging numerous misrepresentations
on the part of defendant sellers as to sufficiency of construction
thereof. The lower court was reversed, with directions to dismiss.
The Supreme Court held that the damage of which the plaintiff
complained was a result of a condition which developed subsequent to the completion of her house and not from any defect in
construction, but from causes not known to exist at the time she
bought the property.
Chamberlain v. Poe 4 was an action for $12,000 damages for
defendant's failure to procure flood insurance on plaintiff's house.
The plaintiff purchased a home, financed same through defendant
loan company. The defendant also wrote the insurance covering
the house and assured plaintiff it was covered with flood insurance.
A flood did extensive damage to plaintiff's house, but the insurance
as written did not cover flood damage. Plaintiff refused to make
monthly payments on his loan so the defendant started foreclosure.
The plaintiff, by telegram, requested the defendant to dismiss foreclosure and agreed to repair the house at plaintiff's own expense.
Defendant dismissed foreclosure and the plaintiff made monthly
payments under a refinance plan. Plaintiff sued two and one-half
years later.
The Supreme Court reversed the $9,333 judgment of the lower
court with instructions to dismiss the action, holding that plaintiff
is estopped from bringing his action when he obtained a valuable
consideration (dismissal of foreclosure and refinancing) for an implied promise not to sue.
In Sanders v. Gomez 5 the plaintiff brought an action to quiet
title on basis of adverse possession to part of three lots, the remaining part of which was occupied by record owners, the defendants. The plaintiff had fenced a portion of the lots. The jury, acting
in this equity case in an advisory capacity, found the plaintiff did
not have open, notorious, and adverse possession for the 18-year
statutory period. The court approved the finding of the jury and
ruled for defendants. The Supreme Court upheld the lower court
and held that the verdict of jury is advisory only in equitable actions; however, judgment in quiet title action will not be disturbed
if supported by the evidence.
In Eitel v. Alford 6 the plaintiffs, husband and wife, brought
an action against the defendants, husband and wife, for foreclosure
I ........
Colo ..........
251 P. 2d 1080 (1952). 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 9, p. 115.
........
Colo ..........
256 P. 2d 229 (1953). 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 12, p. 182.
........
Colo .........
255 P. 2d 972 (1953). 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv Sh. No. 17, p. 261.
6........
Colo .........
257 P. 2d 955 (1953). 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv.. Sh. No. 18, p. 277.
4

DICTA

Dec., 1953

of two deeds of trust covering certain real estate. The defendants
counterclaimed for rescission of the procedure contract and cancellation of the deeds of trust and notes, alleging wrongful delivery
to plaintiff of note and deeds of trust by defendant bank.
The plaintiffs had sold real estate to the defendant under a
contract presumably agreeing not to close the deal until the title
was approved. Defendant closed the deal anyway and then the
title was found defective. The defendant urges that defendant
bank was to hold the papers until approval of title under the contract. The Court found no such agreement and that defendant made
no complaint to the plaintiff upon discovery. The plaintiff alleged
that he stood ready to clear title at any time. The defendant subsequently defaulted on the notes and deed of trust after making
certain payments thereunder. The Supreme Court held for the
plaintiff, against the defendant on the counter claim, and granted
foreclosure. The Court held that parties to a contract must exercise
reasonable business prudence. A contract will not be rescined because of ignorance of certain facts by one party when full information was readily available to him and he accepted the fruits of
the contract for a long period. This principle applies even though
the contract may be the result of mutual mistake or actual fraud.
Rogers v. Fitzsimmons 7 was an action for cancellation and
rescission of contract of purchase. Plaintiff bought mountain lots
from defendant. Jury found that defendant represented to plaintiff
that the lots were of a certain size. Thhe lots were in fact smaller,
resulting in a loss of a sale for plaintiff. Plaintiff paid two monthly
payments under the contract after discovering the discrepency and
and then brought this action.
The Court held: (1) Payment after discovery did not constitute waiver of the right to rescind-it was merely preserving the
rights of both parties should decree go against plaintiff; (2) Plaintiff had the option of two remedies: (a) damages or (b) equitable
rescission; (3) Misrepresentation is ground for rescission of a
contract-one can continue payments required by a contract without waiving his right to rescission of the contract.

SUPREME COURT AMENDS RULE

"Rule 217 concerning admissions to the bar, be and the same
is hereby amended to read as follows:
"217. Subsequent Examinations. Any applicant in Class C or
D who fails on examination to obtain a passing grade may take
the next succeeding examination. If he then fails he may be permitted to take a third examination upon a detailed showing which
indicates systematic study, and then only by special permission of
the court en bane.
"No further examinations will be permitted."
Adopted by the court en bane, November 23, 1953. Effective
July 15, 1954.
........ Colo .......... 257 P. 2d 420 (1953). 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 19, p. 289.

